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COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES IN TAX
LITIGATION: 42 U.S.C. § 1988
I. INTRODUCTION
A taxpayer's decision to litigate his federal tax liability is
usually based on economic considerations. The taxpayer must
balance the costs of litigation : against the possible tax saving should
he prevail.2 The largest single cost of such litigation will likely be
attorneys' fees. In many cases these fees will be so high that a tax-
payer will be unwilling "to go to the mat" 3 with the government
in order to prove his point-even though the taxpayer may well
stand an excellent chance of ultimately prevailing on the merits.
The government, on the other hand, need not weigh these costs in
deciding whether to settle a particular case because of its virtually
limitless resources, at least in comparison to the individual tax-
payer's. That section of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976 - referred to as the Allen amendment has the potential
to alter that imbalance of resources substantially.
Under the terms of the amendment, the statute allows "the
court, in its discretion," to award "a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs" to "the prevailing party, other than the United States,"
"in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United
States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision
of the United States Internal Revenue Code." 5 On its face the
I Common costs of litigation include attorneys' fees, costs of taking depositions,
witness fees and expenses, and court filing fees. Costs, other than attorneys' fees,
may be recovered from the United States by a prevailing party. 28 U.S.C. § 2412
(1970). The Tax Court, however, has ruled that costs are not recoverable in
Tax Court. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 533 (1976). See also Key
Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178 (1977).
2 The possible tax saving is not necessarily limited to the current year; successful
litigation may also bring tax savings in future years. For example, if a larger basis
is established for a depreciable asset, increased depreciation deductions will bring
tax savings in future years.
Tax litigation, on the other hand, does involve certain risks for taxpayers. The
Commissioner, for instance, could discover new matters and allege an increased
deficiency. In such a case the taxpayer may wish he had not brought suit. L. KErM
& D. ARUE, TAx CounT PRAG cE 7 3.03 (5th ed. 1976).
3 See text accompanying note 90 infra.
4 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (to be codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988) [hereinafter cited as Attorney's Fees Act or Act].
5Id. The Attorney's Fees Act states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1978,
1979, 1980 and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title IX of Public Law 92-318,
or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States
of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the
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statute appears straightforward; in the context of established tax
procedure,6 however, the statutory language is sufficiently ambiguous
as to cause substantial problems of interpretation. Consequently,
courts construing the Allen amendment have differed on its proper
construction.7 The key questions in this regard are:
1. Whether attorneys' fees may be awarded in all civil tax
cases, including those instances in which the taxpayer is tech-
nically the plaintiff (in the Tax Court and in taxpayer refund
suits),8 or whether such an award is limited to those cases in
which the United States is the plaintiff, and
2. Assuming a court has the authority to award attorneys' fees
in a particular case, under what circumstances should it exer-
cise its power of discretion to make such an award? 9
The majority of those courts that have considered the issue have
construed the Allen amendment narrowly; 10 thus far under the new
statute, attorneys' fees have been granted only twice in tax cases."'
In addition, most courts have indicated that the government must
have acted in bad faith or for purposes of harassment before an
award of attorneys' fees under the Allen amendment will be con-
sidered appropriate.12 This Comment examines those court de-
cisions with particular attention to the legislative history of the
Allen amendment and the relevant policies behind it. The practical
effect of a narrow reading of the amendment is examined in light of
United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id. (text of Allen amendment italicized).
For an excellent article on the Allen amendment, written before any courts had
dealt with the Act, see Ellentuck, Holub, & Solomon, Attorneys' Fees Awards in Tax
Litigation Now Available to Successful Litigants, 46 J. TAx. 157 (1977).
6 See text accompanying notes 15-20 infra.
7 See notes 22 & 23 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 infra.
9 See Ellentuck, Holub, & Solomon, supra note 5, at 158.
10 See note 22 infra.
"1 United States v. Garrison Constr. Co., [1977] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 79705
(N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 1977); Levno v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mont.
1977).
The reluctance of the courts to award attorneys' fees may be the fulfillment of
the prophetic remarks made by Representative Drinan during the consideration of
the Allen amendment. In those remarks he expressed his belief that the amendment
would allow taxpayer recovery of attorneys' fees only in "unique and really im-
possible circumstances." 122 CONG. REc. H12,152 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (re-
marks of Rep. Drinan).
12 See note 72 infra & accompanying text.
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relevant tax procedures. The Comment concludes that the majority
of courts have construed the amendment too narrowly, thereby
stripping it of any real significance. Further, the Comment suggests
that, in the exercise of its equitable discretion under the Allen
amendment, a court should adopt a broader view and study relevant
factors other than bad faith or harassment; the relative resources
and economic strengths of the taxpayer and government are sug-
gested as particularly relevant considerations.
II. POWER TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE
ALLEN AMENDMENT
A. Federal Tax Procedure
In order for a court to grant attorneys' fees to a prevailing tax-
payer,13 the Act requires that the United States have initiated a civil
action or proceeding to enforce a provision or charge a violation of
the Internal Revenue Code.' 4 One with little knowledge of the
procedural posture in tax cases might think that the government
would sue the taxpayer for any deficiency; ' this, however, is not the
case. When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determines that
a tax deficiency exists, a notice of deficiency is sent to the taxpayer; 16
the next move is the taxpayer's. 17 He has three choices of forum: 18
13 The determination of who is the prevailing party will be made according to
federal law. Lieb v. United States, [1977] 2 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCH) fi 9752 (E.D.
Okla. Sept. 29, 1977). A body of federal case law already exists concerning awards
of costs other than attorneys' fees. See 10 C. Wosr-rr & A. MmLR, FEDEnAL
PRACTICE Arn PRocEDuRE: C=wir § 2667, at 128-31 (1973). It may not always be
easy to tell who is the prevailing party, however. See Ellentuck, Holub, & Solomon,
supra note 5, at 160.
14 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
15 For a definition of the term "deficiency," see I.R.C. § 6211; Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6211-1, T.D. 7102, 1971-1 C.B. 393, 395.
16 I.R.C. § 6212.
17 Generally, the taxpayer has 90 days in which to decide whether to appeal the
deficiency to the Tax Court. I.R.C. § 6213. After the expiration of the statutory
period, the Service may assess the amount of the deficiency, I.R.C. § 6213(c), and
demand payment, I.R.C. § 6303.
18 There are many factors that enter into the choice of forum. A major con-
sideration is whether the taxpayer has the ability to pay the deficiency; if not, he
must sue in the Tax Court.
If the taxpayer has the ability to pay, the next most important criterion is
precedent. If there is a favorable case on point in one of the available tribunals,
that forum is the obvious choice in which to litigate. If specific precedent doesn't
exist, the taxpayer must then look for analogous cases and choose the forum that
seems most sympathetic to the facts of his case. It should be noted that the Tax
Court now follows the circuit to which the case may be appealed. Golson v. Com-
missioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 940 (1971). See I.R.C. § 7482(a).
Other factors may also influence the choice of forum. For example, the Tax
Court and the Court of Claims may be more expert in resolving issues of difficult
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the Tax Court, the district courts, or the Court of Claims. If the
taxpayer chooses to sue in the Tax Court, no payment is required.
If he chooses to bring the action in either a district court or the
Court of Claims, the taxpayer must pay the full amount of the
alleged deficiency and then sue for a refund.19 The taxpayer is the
plaintiff in each forum, and thus, technically, has initiated the court
action. In reality, however, the taxpayer would never have done so
unless forced to contest the Commissioner's deficiency assessment.
In the terms of the Allen amendment, the issue is whether the
phrase "action or proceeding" is broad enough to include the de-
ficiency assessment process initiated by the Commissioner.20 If so,
the statute will apply to suits in which the taxpayer is the nominal
plaintiff. If "proceeding" is given a narrow meaning, as most courts
have done, the statute will be severely limited and will apply only
to a restricted class of tax actions in which the government is the
named plaintiff.
21
B. Judicial Interpretation
The majority of those courts that have considered the Allen
amendment have construed it narrowly, holding that it is applicable
statutory interpretation or application; on the other hand, if a jury trial is desired,
the district court may be more appropriate. Other considerations include differ-
ences in available discovery procedures (compare TAX CT. B. PtAc. & Phoc. 80-84
with CT. CL. R. 71(d)-(f) and FED. B. Crv. P. 26, 30), docket backlog, availability
of witnesses and subpoena powers (compare IR.C. § 7456 with 28 U.S.C. § 2521
(1970) and FED. B. Cxv. P. 45(e)), and the authority of courts to award costs (see
note 1 supra).
The availability of an award of attorneys' fees is one more consideration that
must be weighed in the choice-of-forum decision. Attorneys' fees are currently
unavailable to prevailing taxpayers in both the Tax Court, Key Buick Co. v. Com-
missiofier, 68 T.C. 178 (19,77), and the Court of Claims, Aparacor, Inc. v. United
States, [1978] 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 111251 (Ct. CL Feb. 22, 1978). Although
this Comment suggests that attorneys' fees should be available in all tax forums,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, such is not now the case; the attorney must, therefore,
consider the recovery of fees in his choice-of-forum calculation.
Largely because of the above factors, forum shopping is commonplace in tax
litigation. For a criticism of the resulting inconsistencies in tax law, see U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Study of the Trial Court System for Federal Civil Tax Disputes, 22
TAX LAw. 95, 106-19 (1968).
19 See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). See also I.R.C. § 7422 (e),
which requires the taxpayer to choose one of the three courts, thus prohibiting
simultaneous litigation in the three forums.
20 The term "action" is almost entirely synonymous with "suit." BLAcx's LAw
DicA IoAEY 49 (4th ed. 1968). The word "action," however, is combined with "or
proceeding." In light of established tax procedure, see text accompanying notes
15-19 supra, it would seem that the additional phrase was intended as one of
enlargement and should be so construed.
21 See notes 63-66 infra & accompanying text.
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only to actions in which the government is the plaintiff.22 Thus far,
only a limited number of decisions 23 have dealt with the provision,
and none has been reviewed by a court of appeals; therefore, its
scope remains undetermined.
Only one court has allowed taxpayer recovery of attorneys' fees
in an action in which the taxpayer, rather than the government,
was the named plaintiff. In its cryptic decision in Levno v. United
States,24 the District Court of Montana concluded that "[tlhe status
of a party as a plaintiff or as a defendant is not relevant with respect
to the award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in a tax
case or proceeding." 25 No reasoning or analysis, however, was
offered to illuminate the court's conclusion; the usefulness of the
decision is therefore limited.
In the remainder of those suits in which taxpayers were the
named plaintiffs, the courts have not allowed recovery of attorneys'
fees.26 Representative of those decisions is Key Buick Co. v. Com-
missioner.27 Based on the language of the statute, the Tax Court
found that the Act applies only to actions "by or on behalf of the
United States." 28 Because, in its opinion, a suit by a taxpayer-
plaintiff is, "in a strict sense," "' by or on behalf' of the taxpayer,
[and] not the United States," the court held the statute to be in-
22 See, e.g., Lieb v. United States, [1977] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19752
(E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 1977); Schulken Bros. Paper Stock Co. v. United States,
[1977] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) [9712 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1977); Aparacor, Inc.
v. United States, [1978] 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19251 (Ct. C]. Feb. 22, 1978);
Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. No. 36 (Dec. 15, 1977);
Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178 (1977).
23 Star Oil Co. v. United States, [1978] 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) F 9160 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 16, 1977); Haskin v. United States, [1978] 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
f1 9197 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1977); United States v. Garrison Constr. Co., [1977] 2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ff 9705 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 1977); Chrome Plate, Inc. v. District
Director of Internal Revenue, [1978] 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19104 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 7, 1977); Ellis Sarasota Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, [1978] FED. EsT.
& G=-T TAx REP. (CCH) f1 13,222 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 1977); Lieb v. United States,
[1977] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) f19752 (E.D. Okla. Sept 29, 1977); Schulken Bros.
Paper Stock Co. v. United States, [1977] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 119712 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 29, 1977); Levno v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mont. 1977); Battlestein
v. District Director of Internal Revenue, [1977] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) f1 9516
(S.D. Tex. June 15, 1977); Patzkowski v. United States, No. 75-2002 (D. Iowa
May 9, 1977); Kline v. Feinblatt, 429 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 1977); Aparacor,
Inc. v. United States, [1978] 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ff 9251 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 22,
1978); Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. No. 36 (Dec. 15,
1977); Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178 (1977).
24440 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mont. 1977).
235 Id. 11.
2 6 See note 22 supra.
27 68 T.C. 178 (1977).
28 Id. 179.
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applicable to all such taxpayer actions.29 Further, the court asserted
that, because taxpayers are always the petitioners in the Tax Court,
the Attorney's Fees Act has no applicability whatsoever in that
forum.30 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that the Act
was added to a section of the United States Code that begins: "the
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts." 3 1 From this, the court concluded that the Allen amend-
ment was applicable only to district courts. Finally, although the
Act provides that "the court . . . may allow . . . a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs," 32 the Key Buick court reasoned
that it could not award attorneys' fees, because the earlier opinion
in Sharon v. Commissioner 33 had held that it was not within the
competence of the Tax Court to allow costs. The Key Buick court
also found that the relevant legislative history supported a narrow
reading of the statute. The court relied upon remarks by Senators
Kennedy and Tunney, and emphasized particularly their use of the
word "defendant" in describing those whom the statute was intended
to cover.34 Remarks made by Senator Allen three months subse-
quent to the passage of the Act, urging a broad interpretation, were
rejected as not properly part of the legislative history.35
C. Analysis
1. Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation
The Allen amendment was added to the Attorney's Fees Act on
the same day that the Senate passed it 31 as a compromise to enable
passage of the bill in the Senate.
37
Therefore, neither the committee report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee (S. Rept. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976)) nor the committee report of the House of
Representatives Judiciary Committee (H. Rept. No.
94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)), have any reference to
actions or proceedings under the Internal Revenue Code.
38
29 Id.
3Old.
3142 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) (amended 1976).
32 Id., as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
83 66 T.C. 515, 533-34 (1976).
34 68 T.C. 178, 181.
35 Id. 183.
36 See 122 CoNG. REc. S17,049-53 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976).
37"The compromise made by accepting the amendment concerning IS fees
makes the bill more palatable and represents the best the opponents could ac-
complish." Id. S17,053 (remarks of Sen. Morgan).
aSKey Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178, 180 (1977).
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The only legislative history consists of the Senate and House floor
debates and, because of the limited debate, the reported comments
of Senators and Representatives are to some extent inconsistent or,
at best, unclear. A careful reading of the Congressional Record
highlights those inconsistencies and illustrates the confusion and
misunderstanding that may have been present in the minds of the
legislators.
When Senator Allen proposed his amendment, he stated that it
was "not unfamiliar to the Senate," because it was "similar to the
Goldwater amendment." 39 The Goldwater amendment was an ex-
plicit proposal that covered expenses in administrative proceedings
before the Service as well as in court, and applied to suits brought
by either the taxpayer or the government. 40 One could infer from
Senator Allen's remark that he intended his amendment to be a
broad piece of legislation, similar in scope to the Goldwater pro-
posal. At another point in that same discussion, however, Senator
Allen further described his amendment:
What it does is to add to the civil rights attorneys' fees
provision a provision that if the Internal Revenue Service
or the U.S. Government brings a civil action against a tax-
payer to enforce any provision of the Internal Revenue
Code, and the Government does not prevail against the
taxpayer, then the court, in its discretion, just as in other
cases, would be entitled to award the taxpayer reasonable
attorneys' fees. That is all it does, and I hope the amend-
ment will be agreed to.
41
Because Senator Allen specifically referred to those actions in which
the government "brings a civil action," one possible interpretation
is that the courts' narrow construction 2 is the one he intended.
It is not at all clear, however, that Senator Allen actually had con-
sidered the technical question of who stands as plaintiff in tax
litigation. An interesting indication of the Senator's possible con-
fusion on the general issue of procedure in tax litigation is his
reference in the same sentence to "any provision of the Internal
Revenue Code" (emphasis added). Logically, the breadth of the
39 122 CoNo. REc. S17,049 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Alien).
40Id. S16,445-46 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976). See id. S16,482 (daily ed. Sept.
23, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater).
41122 CONG. REc. S17,049 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Allen).
42 See text accompanying notes 22-35 supra.
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word "any" should encompass more than those limited circumstances
in which the government is the plaintiff.43
Following Senator Allen's remarks, Senator Helms, the co-
sponsor of the amendment, said: "It will provide a measure of equity
and fairness to the taxpayers of this country who, in many instances,
are being harassed and intimidated by the Internal Revenue
Service." 44 In the week preceding the adoption of the Allen amend-
ment, Senator Goldwater had offered examples of how taxpayers,
including himself, had been harassed by the Service.45 These ex-
amples were not instances where the Service had filed suit against a
taxpayer; they were, instead, occasions on which the Service had
initiated administrative proceedings. It is quite likely that Senator
Helms made his remarks regarding harassment in response to
Senator Goldwater's statements, and, if so, this supports a broad
interpretation of the statute that would provide some measure of
protection for taxpayers against administrative harassment by the
Service.
Legislative concern with Internal Revenue Service harassment
of taxpayers reappears in remarks by Senator Tunney, the initial
sponsor of the Attorney's Fees Act. With respect to the Allen
amendment, he stated:
Essentially, it would apply to a situation where a taxpayer
is harassed by the IRS. In such a case, a court has discre-
tion to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the defendant.
The standard to be applied is the one the courts have
adopted with respect to prevailing defendants, as described
in the Senate report.
46
43 The merit of a broader construction of the statute based on its legislative
history was recently recognized in Ellis Sarasota Bank & Trust Co., [1978] FEm.
EST. & GIFT TAX BRE. (CCH) ff 13,222, at 18,194 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 1977).
44 122 CONC. REC. S17,050 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
45 Id. S16,482 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater). Id.
S16,446 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater). Senator Gold-
water recounted his own experience with the Service:
I won a rather sizable lawsuit involving accusations made against
me during my Presidential campaign. After receiving an award that with
interest came to $96,000, I had to pay an additional either $8,000 or
$11,000. So I was in the hole.
Ever since that happened, my name has been on the computer tape,
year after year after year, for no reason at all. I actually think I am a little
bit ahead of the Government because they find I am not only right, but
have overpaid them. As long as a name stays on that computer tape, it
will be audited year after year after year.
Id. S16,482 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater).
46 122 CONG. REc. S17,050 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney)
(emphasis added).
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These remarks by Senator Tunney contain the only reported use of
the word "defendant" in the floor debate prior to the Senate's
adoption of the Allen amendment.47  Senator Tunney's use of the
word, however, is instructive, when "defendant" is accorded its com-
mon meaning. Although the taxpayer is technically the plaintiff in
most tax suits, his position is actually like that of a defendant.48
When "defendant" is interpreted as a description of the taxpayer's
posture rather than as a technical term, Senator Tunney's assertion
that the appropriate standard in tax cases would be that "adopted
with respect to prevailing defendants" is not inconsistent with the
broader reading suggested by the other Senators' comments. Those
courts that have based their analyses on a literal reading of the word
"defendant" 49 thus appear to have disregarded this common sense
view in favor of a too technical reading of the statute.
Three months after the Act became law Senator Allen at-
tempted to dispel the confusion surrounding his amendment, stating:
The idea simply is that in any proceeding in which the
Government asserts a taxpayer's liability for a tax and the
taxpayer asserts that he is not liable for the tax and there-
after prevails, then a court may award fees to the taxpayer
as the court sees fit. The form which the action takes is
not of consequence. Since all tax disputes boil down to
the Government asserting a liability and a taxpayer deny-
ing it, the formal position of the two parties is immaterial.
The problem my amendment corrects does not relate to
procedural formalities; it relates instead to the substantive
imbalance in resources available to the Government and
47Following adoption of the Allen amendment, but prior to the passage of the
Act, Senator Kennedy also had spoken of the taxpayer as "defendant." Id. (remarks
of Sen. Kennedy).
48 See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
49 Robert Malson (former Acting Chief Counsel to the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States Senate) commented on the Allen amendment:
The question of the right of a prevailing defendant to recover fees took
on greater weight with the acceptance of the Allen amendment to the bill.
The question arises because the amendment was offered for the purpose
of benefiting a class of litigants who are almost always defendants--pre-
vailing taxpayers in an action involving the Internal Revenue Service.
Malson, In Response to Alyeska-The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 21 ST. Louis L.J. 430, 437 (1977) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Prevailing taxpayers are usually not defendants but almost always plaintiffs. See
Ellentuck, Holub & Solomon, supra note 5, at 158. Thus it seems that Malson has
fallen into the same trap as have many Senators.
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to a taxpayer when the two dispute an issue of tax
liability.50
Although these remarks were not available to the Senate before the
amendment was passed, and, as such, are not part of the legislative
history,5' Senator Allen's explanation is sensible and gives the legis-
lation practical significance. As he indicated, resolution of the issue
should not depend on procedural formality but on the reality of the
situation. The Key Buick rationale that ignores these functional
realities should therefore be rejected.
As a matter of accepted statutory interpretation, a particular
provision should be construed in light of the context in which it
occurs 2 In Key Buick, the Tax Court inferred from the provision's
location in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (which confers jurisdiction on the
district courts) that the Tax Court (not being a district court) can-
not award attorneys' fees.53 The Allen amendment, however, was a
hurried compromise r' and did not properly belong in that section;
its placement there was the result of political compromise, not
logic. 55 It would seem unwise therefore to derive its meaning from
50 123 CoNG. BEc. S731, S732 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Allen)
(emphasis added). In addition Senator Allen stated:
Moreover, I inserted the word "proceeding" in my new amendment
specifically to include administrative proceedings or audits so that fees and
costs in connection with audits or other I.R.S. agency proceedings could
be awarded by a court on application of a prevailing taxpayer. I also
included the term "proceeding" so that it would be clear that in any case
involving a disputed tax, the court would be free to award attorney fees
so long as the taxpayer prevailed and the court felt that a fee award was
appropriate considering all factors in the case and notwithstanding the
formalistic characterization of the taxpayer as plaintiff or defendant or as
appellant and appellee.
Incredibly, Mr. President, some commentators have suggested that my
amendment would only apply in cases in which the Internal Revenue
Service brought an action to recover an alleged overpayment of a tax
refund. I find that suggestion ludicrous. Certainly that could not have
been in the mind of any Senator here when we adopted my proposal.
No, Mr. President, that interpretation of my amendment would make our
action meaningless and would require a highly formalistic--indeed, almost
18th century-reading of the words used. Mr. President, the idea was
simple, and I believe it was reasonably clearly expressed.
Id. (emphasis added).
51Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178, 183 (1977).
52 See, e.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLTm. L. Rv. 527, 537-38 (1947).
53Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178, 179 (1977). See text ac-
companying notes 43-46 supra.
54 See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra & accompanying text.
55 For example, the Goldwater amendment, that Senator Allen claimed to be
similar to his own, 120 CoNG. REc. S17,049 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of
Sen. Allen), was a proposed amendment to that section of title 26 that controls the
jurisdiction of the Tax Court. 122 CoNG. Poc. S16,446 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
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the context of the surrounding statutory sections. Furthermore, the
legislative history does not distinguish among courts that may exer-
cise discretion to allow attorneys' fees. The language of the Act
itself refers simply to "the court"; therefore, any tribunal that may
be termed "a court" should have authority to award fees under
the Act.5 6
Finally, in Key Buick the Tax Court relied on its earlier de-
cision in Sharon v. Commissioner 57 to find that the Tax Court had
no power to award attorneys' fees.58 Literally, section 1988 allows
award of attorneys' fees only as a part of "costs," which was con-
strued to refer to those costs allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 2412.51 In
Sharon, the Tax Court held that it had no authority to award those
costs,60 a decision which is supportable on two grounds. First, the
costs provision appears in title 28 and applies only to courts as de-
fined in that title.61 The Tax Court, however, is organized under
provisions of title 26 (Internal Revenue Code). Hence, the costs
provisions in title 28 could have no authorizing effect on a court
56 Prior to 1970, however, the Tax Court was not a "court"; rather, it was an
administrative agency within the executive branch. See Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966); Martin
v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966);
Lasky v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 1027
(1957); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 76, § 7441, 68A Stat. 879 (now I.R.C. § 744).
In 1969, however, Congress granted the Tax Court status as a "court" under
article I, section 8 of the Constitution. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending I.R.C. § 7441). See Note, Procedural and Ad-
ministrative Changes in the Tax Court Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 8
Hous. L. REv. 395, 396-98 (1970); Note, Recent Legislative Changes in the Con-
stitutional Status of the United States Tax Court and the Courts of the District of
Columbia, 1973 WAsn. U. L.Q. 381.
57 66 T.C. 515 (1976).
58 68 T.C. at 179.
59 Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for
costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the
fees and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in
any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or
official of the United States acting in his official capacity, in any court
having jurisdiction of such action.
28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970).
60 66 T.C. at 533-34.
6128 U.S.C. § 451 (1970) states:
As used in this title: The term "court of the United States" includes
the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeals, district courts
constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of Claims, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court and any court
created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office
during good behavior.
A distinction between the constitutional status of the Tax Court and the district
courts and Court of Claims provides an argument for denying the Tax Court juris-
diction to award attorneys' fees and other costs. The status of the Tax Court as an
article I or legislative court (C. WiuGsT, lADBOOK OF TE LAW OF FEnmatL
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created under title 26. Second, as an historical matter, when section
2412 was enacted, the Tax Court was a separate administrative
agency and technically not a court. Therefore, section 2412 could
not have been intended to confer the authority to award costs on
that administrative agency. Key Buick's extension of Sharon to deny
the Tax Court's authority to award attorneys' fees is incorrect. First,
it is unlikely that those who sponsored the Allen amendment
realized the technical and restrictive meaning of the word "costs"
and the trap it presented for the taxpayer-litigator. Second, the
Allen amendment was designed specifically to relieve a problem
concerning tax litigation. Congress could not have meant to deny
the Tax Court-the forum that handles the largest amount of tax
litigation 62-the authority to award attorneys' fees. Courts should
not do so now by a hypertechnical reading of the statute.
2. Policy Considerations
The most compelling argument in favor of a broad construction
of the statute is a consideration of its actual scope were courts to
continue to construe it as narrowly as they have so far. Although
the taxpayer is usually the plaintiff in civil tax litigation,63 the
government may be the plaintiff-in actions to enforce summonses "
and collect taxes,65 for instance. Generally, the substantive tax
CounTs § 11 (3d ed. 1976)) with judges who serve a fifteen year term theoretically
makes the Tax Court a less impartial tribunal than the article MI courts in which
judges serve for good behavior. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 1. Therefore, the dis-
cretion of the court should be limited. In practice, however, there is little difference
between the judicial nature of the Tax Court and the district courts. See Kenner
v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 689, 690 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968);
Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 918 (1966); Martin v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 920 (1966). Although the judges serve fifteen year terms, I.R.C.
§ 7443(e), the provisions for removal are limited, I.R.C. § 7443(f), and almost all
judges are appointed automatically for additional terms if the judge so desires.
See Gribbon, Should the Judicial Character of the Tax Court be RecognizedP, 24
GEO. WA.sH. L. REv. 619, 629 n.31 (1956).
62 Of the 12,224 tax suits filed in fiscal year 1975, 11,206 were filed in the Tax
Court. [1975] IRS Commdn ANx. R P. 50-51.
63 See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
64 See I.R.C. § 7604.
65 [T]he Commissioner may avail himself of one of three methods of col-
lection: (1) he may bring suit against the taxpayer in a state or federal court
to recover the amount of the tax and execute on the judgment; (2) under
[IR.C.] section 6331(a) he may proceed by the summary method of dis-
traint and levy against the taxpayer's non-exempt property and sell it to
satisfy the amount of the assessment; or (3) he may proceed by court
action under [I.R.C.] section 7403 to enforce its lien provided by [I.R.C.]
section 6321 upon the taxpayer's real and personal property.
J. Caomm, FE.DRAL INcoim TA-XATION 910 (2d ed. 1973).
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liability of the taxpayer, however, is not raised as an issue in such
cases; the correctness of the Commissioner's deficiency assessment is
usually litigated in other instances.6" In limiting application of
the Allen amendment to those actions in which the government is
the named plaintiff, the courts have reduced the statute to relative
meaninglessness. With a single exception, the courts have refused
to acknowledge that this is the inevitable result of a narrow reading
of the amendment. In Aparacor, Inc. v. United States,67 Judge
Nichols, although concurring with the court in its narrow reading
of the statute, stated:
I would have . . . squarely faced up to this fact: the
Allen amendment, as construed by the court, accomplishes
an insignificant result, unworthy of the attention devoted
to it by the Congress in Debate. This is because, when the
Government asserts and the taxpayer denies a liability for a
tax, the Internal Revenue laws are so framed that it is the
taxpayer who must sue. The Government need not do so.
If the taxpayer should wait for the Government to sue him,
he would allow the assessment to become final, and his
right to contest his liability would be gone forever.68
The courts must, as Judge Nichols suggested, "squarely face"
the fact that, in adopting a narrow construction of the Allen amend-
ment, they have effectively nullified an action of Congress. Although
the Aparacor court was willing to accept that outcome, it is not a
result that other courts should readily embrace. Undeniably, the
more reasonable approach is that which accords meaning and con-
tent to congressional statutes. Courts should avoid an approach,
such as some have used, that hinges on the technical definitions of
"plaintiff" and "defendant," while ignoring the practical realities of
tax litigation. After all, neither the word "plaintiff" nor the word
"defendant" ever appears in the Act. The only requirement in this
regard is that the government have initiated the action or pro-
ceeding.
Further, if the decision in Key Buick continues as authority in
the Tax Court but is not uniformly adopted elsewhere, taxpayers
for whom the Tax Court is the only available forum will be those
66 See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
The Second Circuit, however, has allowed a taxpayer "to challenge the under-
lying merits of the assessment" in an action brought by the United States to enforce
a lien. United States v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696, 698 (2d Cir. 1965).
67 [1978] 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1r9251 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 29, 1978).
68 Id. 83, 486.
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most injured. The prime motivation in creating the Tax Court
was to provide a forum for taxpayers to litigate the determination of
their tax liability prior to payment. 9 Because the taxpayer must
pay and sue for a refund in the other available forums, the Tax
Court is the only forum for a taxpayer with illiquid or limited
resources.70 Denying this taxpayer the ability to recover his attor-
neys' fees is a detriment impacting specifically upon the class of
taxpayers the Allen amendment was designed to help.71
In light of the actual posture of the parties in tax litigation,
the added burden on the taxpayer with limited resources, and the
severely limited scope of the provision if construed narrowly, the
logical conclusion is that courts should interpret the statute suffi-
ciently broadly to permit a prevailing taxpayer to recover attorneys'
fees when he is the nominal plaintiff, but his actual position ap-
proximates that of the defendant in the usual lawsuit.
III. GUIDELINES FOR THE AwARD OF ArrORNEyS' FEES
The standard by which a court is to exercise its discretion in
awarding attorneys' fees is not stated in the statute. For the most
part, the courts have adopted a standard which requires a showing
of bad faith or harassment on the part of the Government.72 In
United States v. Garrison Construction Co.,7 3 however, the court
specifically held that the government action need not rise to the
level of bad faith. There, the court awarded attorneys' fees to a
taxpayer against whom the Service had commenced an enforcement
of summons proceeding. The Service had previously been "advised
that the taxpayer had submitted to one complete inspection of its
books . . . and that additional inspection would not be allowed
unless the Secretary . . . informed [the] taxpayer in writing pur-
suant to Internal Revenue Code section 7605(b) that an additional
inspection was necessary." 7- Thus, the suit should not have been
69 See H.R. BE. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924); Flora v. United
States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958); Oshausen v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820 (1960).
70 See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
71 See text accompanying note 90 supra.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Garrison Constr. Co., 11977] 2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 79705 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 1977); Ellis Sarasota Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, [1978] FED. EsT. & GrsT TAX REP. (CCH) 7f13,222 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 4, 1977); Schulken Bros. Paper Stock Co. v. United States, [1977] 2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 7[9712 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1977); Kline v. Feinblatt, 429 F. Supp.
1025 (D. Md. 1977).
73 [1977] 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 79705 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 1977).
74 Id. 88,389.
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brought, because the procedure for additional inspections had not
been followed. In conclusion, the court held that bad faith did not
have to be shown, "but that the Court may award fees where a tax-
payer has been subjected to vexatious or harassing treatment not
amounting to bad faith." 75
Another case indicates that even a showing of governmental
harassment may be unnecessary for taxpayer recovery under the
Allen amendment. In Levno v. United States,78 the District Court
of Montana awarded attorneys' fees to a taxpayer even though no
issue of harassment had been raised. The facts were very similar to
the circumstances underlying cases previously decided in favor of
the taxpayer.77 The plaintiff, a cash-basis farmer, attempted to
smooth out his annual income by selling his cattle in one year and
collecting the proceeds in the following year. The taxpayer arranged
to sell his cattle to the S&H Sheep Company which in turn would
sell the cattle to the livestock market. The sale to S&:H was pursuant
to a written contract providing for payment in the following year,
although S&cH had already been paid by the livestock market. The
Service claimed that the farmer realized taxable income in the year
he sold the cattle. The court held for the taxpayer, and cited
analogous cases and Revenue Rulings; no rationale, however, was
offered for its award of attorneys' fees.78 In light of the strong legal
precedent 79 favoring the taxpayer, the court may have been indi-
cating that the suit should not have been brought.8 0 As Senator
Allen stated in his remarks subsequent to the Act's passage:
My amendment is meant to cover, for example, cases in
which a relatively small tax liability is at issue, legal prece-
dent on the subject clearly favors the taxpayer, yet the
75Id.
76440 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mont. 1977).
77 See, e.g., Amend v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178 (1949) (contract for sale
of wheat, delivery in one taxable year, payment in second).
78 440 F. Supp. at 10-11.
79 It is not clear when precedent may be said to favor the taxpayer. For
example, must the Supreme Court have ruled on the issue, or does a court of
appeals decision constitute sufficient precedent? In reaching its decision, the Levno
court cited Revenue Rulings (Rev. Rul. 162, 1958-1 C.B. 234; Rev. Rul. 358, 1969-1
C.B. 139), a court of appeals opinion from its own circuit (Patterson v. Commis-
sioner, 510 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1975)), and a district court case from another circuit
(Oliver v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ark. 1961)). The court, how-
ever, failed to indicate which of these authorities, if any, were crucial to its
decision.
80 The court might also have been suggesting that the failure of the Service to
follow its own previous rulings was evidence of bad faith. For cases holding that
an agency is bound by its own administrative rulings, see Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932); McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Government persists in litigating an issue which has been
previously resolved or which is fairly obviously going to
result in a decision in favor of the taxpayer.8'
Thus, although the government's action probably did not amount
to harassment, 82 it might be characterized as frivolous. Whatever
the standard is labeled, however, Levno contemplates the award of
attorneys' fees on grounds broader than a bad faith or harassment
standard.
Although both Garrison and Levno are reasonable interpreta-
tions of the Allen amendment, a close reading of the legislative
history supports a broader view. Senator Tunney commented that
"the standard to be applied is the one the courts have adopted with
respect to prevailing defendants, as described in the Senate report." 83
The Senate report allows the recovery of fees if it is "shown that
[the] suit was clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment
purposes" . . . . This bill thus deters frivolous suits . .. ."
The Senate report, however, was written before the original bill was
expanded by the Allen amendment, and did not contemplate suits
by the government.", Furthermore, it is questionable whether the
awarding of attorneys' fees against the United States would actually
deter suits by the Service. Frivolous suits by private plaintiffs in
non-tax actions might well be deterred; the initiator of such an
action must weigh whatever benefit he expects to derive from the
harassment against the cost of both his own and his opponent's at-
torneys' fees. There would be no comparable deterrent effect upon
the Service, however, because any amounts assessed against it would
not come out of any individual's pocket.
Senator Kennedy implicitly recognized a distinction between
tax suits and other types of litigation:
It should be clear, then, that a provision authorizing fee
awards in tax cases has a fundamentally different purpose
83 123 CONG. REc. S731 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Allen)
(emphasis added).
82 "The terms 'bad faith' and 'harassment' connote intentional, purposeful con-
duct motivated by a malicious or discriminatory purpose." Maney v. Ratcliff, 399
F. Supp. 760, 772 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (construing Younger abstention doctrine); see
Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
83 122 CoNG. Eec. S17,050 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Tunney). Senator Tunney also said: "The purpose of this amendment is not to
discourage meritorious lawsuits by the IRS, but to discourage frivolous or harassing
lawsuits." Id.
84 S. BRp. No. 1011, 94th CONG., 2d SEss. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. Nzws 5908 (citations omitted).
85 Id.
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from one authorizing awards in lawsuits brought by private
citizens to enforce the protections of our civil rights laws.
In enacting the basic civil rights attorneys fees awards bill,
Congress clearly intends to facilitate and to encourage the
bringing of actions to enforce the protections of the civil
rights laws. By authorizing awards of fees to prevailing
defendants in cases brought under the Internal Revenue
Code, however, Congress merely intends to protect citizens
from becoming victims of frivilous [sic] or otherwise un-
warranted lawsuits .... 86
Thus, the purpose of the Allen amendment seems to be more one
of protecting the taxpayer by making him "whole" than one at-
tempting to deter suits brought by the government.
Further support for a broad reading of the statute can be de-
rived from the Senate report that accompanied the Act. Although
not technically applicable to the Allen amendment, that report is
important because it indicates the legislative context in which the
amendment was passed. The Senate report adopts the standard
articulated in United States Steel Corp. v. United States,87 which
allows a court's judgment to be guided by both the conduct of the
parties and by economic considerations.8 The economic considera-
tions include the ability of a party to pay, and the amount at issue
in the suit.8 9 Senator Allen echoed the importance of these con-
siderations in his remarks subsequent to the passage of the Act:
[M]y amendment will permit a court in its discretion to
award attorney fees and costs to a taxpayer who elected to
"'go to the mat" with the Government rather than to
cave-in when faced with the prospect of protracted litiga-
tion and substantial attorney fees over an issue involving
a relatively small sum. But, Mr. President, the court need
not determine that the Government has harassed the tax-
payer nor need the court determine that the Government
has in some way acted in bad faith. The amendment was
[sic] adopted mentions neither harassment nor bad faith,
86 122 CoNc. REc. S17,051 (daily ed. Sept. 29., 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy).
87385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975).
88519 F.2d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 1975).
89 The court in United States Steel observed that, unlike a private litigant, the
government's resources are very great and are sustained by the taxing power. Thus,
attorneys' fees may be levied against the government more readily than against a
private party. Although ability to pay may enter into a court's decision whether to
award counsel fees, it would not, standing by itself, appear to be a sufficient ground
on which to base such an award. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519
F.2d 359, 364 n.24 (3d Cir. 1975); see text accompanying note 98 infra.
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but for some reason commentators have implied that such
conduct would be a necessary precondition to an award of
fees to a prevailing taxpayer. No, Mr. President, a court
in exercising its discretion should focus rather on the rela-
tive resources of the parties and on the perseverance of the
taxpayer in vindicating his position.90
Senator Allen's remarks are reminiscent of the private attorney
general rationale for the award of attorneys' fees. The Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act was passed in direct response to the
Supreme Court's rejection of that concept as an equitable doctrine.91
The private attorney general concept recognizes that, in certain cir-
cumstances, actions by private plaintiffs serve the general public
interest; in effect, the private plaintiff is encouraged to undertake
an enforcement role in lieu of the government. 92 Pursuant to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society,93 federal application of the private attorney
general rationale is limited to those instances in which Congress
has given specific statutory authorization for the award of attorneys'
fees.94
The collection of taxes is a basic governmental function. Al-
though it may seem absurd to suggest that the government has any
reasonable interest in encouraging lawsuits which might have the
effect of inhibiting its ability to collect those taxes, there is a sub-
90 123 Com. EEC. S731 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Allen)
(emphasis added).
91 See Malson, supra note 49, at 432-36.
92 See Comment, Taxpayers' Actions: Public Invocation of the judiciary, 13
W. Ax FORE T L. REv. 397, 439 (1977).
The private attorney general rule is an exception to the traditional "American
rule," that requires each litigant to bear the cost of his own lawyer in the absence
of authority to the contrary. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). See also Haunestein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879);
Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1879); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); Arcamble v.
Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The rule is based on the uncertain nature
of litigation and the idea that an individual should not be penalized for prosecuting
or defending a lawsuit the outcome of which is unpredictable. Fleischmann Distill-
ing Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. at 718. The English rule is to the
contrary. The prevailing party is allowed to recover all costs including attorneys"
fees. C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBooK ON THE LAw OF DAmAcEs § 60, at 234-35 (1935);
Goodhart, Costs, 38 YAIE L.J. 849 (1929).
The "American rule," however, has a growing number of statutory exceptions.
See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 281, 303 (1977). These have been prompted by the Supreme Court's
decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 93-94 infra.
93421 U.S. 240 (1975).
94 See Berger, supra note 92, at 282.
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stantial public interest in preventing an arbitrary or unfair applica-
tion of the nation's tax laws. That interest is implicitly recognized
in the legislative history of the Allen amendment 95 and in those
court decisions that have allowed taxpayer recovery of attorneys' fees
where the government has acted frivolously, in bad faith, or for
purposes of harassment.96 The public interest, however, extends
further. The taxpayer should be made whole and should not be
penalized because of an incorrect deficiency assessment by the
Service. The taxpayer with a relatively small tax bill may well
decide not to pursue the issue rather than win his point in court at
the cost of attorneys' fees that may exceed his tax liability.
In an action contemplated by the Allen amendment, a court is
limited only by its equitable discretion in determining whether to
award attorneys' fees.97 Clearly, such an award should be made
when the government has acted in bad faith, frivolously, or for
purposes of harassment. However, a close reading of the legislative
history as well as the presence of sound policy considerations indi-
cate that taxpayer recovery of attorneys' fees should not be so con-
fined. Although the legislative history may not support the award
of attorneys' fees to all prevailing taxpayers, it similarly does not
support the limitation of such awards to instances of governmental
bad faith or harassment. In reaching its decision whether to award
attorneys' fees to a prevailing taxpayer, a court should, as Senator
Allen suggested, take into account the relative resources and eco-
nomic strength of the taxpayer.98 If able to exercise fairly broad
discretion to award attorneys' fees, a court can weigh all relevant
facts and circumstances, and equitable considerations should govern.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Allen amendment has been described as possibly "one of
the most significant developments for the future of tax law (and
tax lawyers)." 99 Although the issue is not yet settled, present inter-
pretation of the statute leaves that prophecy unfulfilled. The con-
fusion in the courts is due to the ambiguous wording of the Act and
a legislative history that is both unclear and inconsistent. Although
Congress could solve most of the problems through further amend-
ment, it is unrealistic to believe that such action will be forth-
95 See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
96 See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra.
97 See note 5 supra.
9 8 See text accompanying note 90 supra.
99 B. BnrER, L. STONE & A. WAmu, Ji., FEDERAL INCOmE, ESTATE AND
GiFT TAXATION 261 (Supp. 1977).
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coming.100 The Allen amendment passed only because it was a
compromise-a means by which the number of votes required to pass
the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act of 1976 could be assembled-and
it is therefore doubtful that Congress will review and clarify the
Act. Moreover, because the Allen amendment has been severely
limited by the courts, those legislators opposed to its passage have
prevailed, as a practical matter, and therefore they will not act.
Although a narrow construction is certain not to expand the
meaning intended by Congress, it is also likely that such a reading
nullifies the intent of Congress; such a construction renders the
statute almost completely ineffective and does nothing to effectuate
its underlying policies.
Whether the amendment is to have any real significance will
depend largely on the diligence of taxpayers in requesting fees from
trial courts and in appealing adverse decisions; there remains an
opportunity to reverse the current trend and obtain rulings favor-
able to the taxpayer-litigator. Any attorney who represents a tax-
payer in a federal tax action should claim a reasonable attorney's
fee if the circumstances of the case indicate that the government's
action or behavior is in some way improper. If the government has
acted frivolously, for the purpose of harassment, or if the issue is
well settled in the taxpayer's favor by established precedent, chances
are best for taxpayer recovery; the economic strength of the tax-
payer should also be a relevant consideration. The attorney must
avoid any temptation to buttress his claim with questionable charges
of bad faith against the government: as the court said in Chrome
Plate, Inc. v. District Director of Internal Revenue,101 "[c]harges of
this nature will, in the future, either be supported by facts or else
left unsaid." 102
1
0 0 For example, Senator Goldwater had been attempting to have enacted
legislation similar to the Allen amendment for 12 years preceding its passage. See
122 CONG. REc. S16,482 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater).
101 [19781 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 7[9104 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1977).
102 Id. 83,020.
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